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1. Introduction
an abstract concept such as “voluminousness” aptly, yet incompletely, 
characterizes any physical body.1 Postulated stages of “stimulus” and “re-
sponse” partition—for fallible, analytical purposes—the continuous physi-
ological process of the reflex arc.2 A judgment of someone as a “murderer” 
may be accurate, but it all too easily becomes a too narrow universal claim 
of that individual’s putative fundamental essence.3
 A pragmatic analysis sheds light on these three cases of abstraction. Ab-
stractions such as concepts, stages, and judgments are purpose-driven, partial, 
and useful for understanding, inference, and intervention. Yet, the dangers of 
what William James termed “vicious abstractionism” and “the psychologist’s 
fallacy,” and John Dewey recognized as “the philosophic fallacy,” loom large 
in any abstraction. According to these two pragmatists, whenever context is 
ignored, abstractions become what will be here called “pernicious reifications.” 
That is, whenever one forgets (i) the particular function, (ii) the historical 
conditions of emergence, and/or (iii) the appropriate analytical level of an 
abstraction,4 the products and processes of abstraction become inappropri-
ately universalized, narrowed, and/or ontologized.
 In order to motivate the abstraction-reification account analyzed in this 
paper, consider a metaphor provided by James:
I have sometimes thought of the phenomenon called “total reflexion” 
in optics as a good symbol of the relation between abstract ideas and 
concrete realities, as pragmatism conceives it. . . . [L]et the water [of an 
aquarium] represent the world of sensible facts, and let the air above it 
represent the world of abstract ideas. . . .We are like fishes swimming 
in the sea of sense, bounded above by the superior element, but  unable 
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to breathe it pure or penetrate it . . . and every time we touch it, we 
are reflected back into the water with our course re-determined and 
re-energized. The abstract ideas of which the air consists are indispens-
able for life, but irrespirable by themselves, as it were, and only active 
in their re-directing function. (Pragmatism 63–64)
Abstraction is “indispensable”; it “re-energize[s]” our inferences and activities. 
Yet, abstractions by themselves are “irrespirable,” and processes of inference, 
concept-formation, and classification can be abused. For instance, Dewey 
presents “the philosophical fallacy”5 with a different water metaphor:
[T]he philosophical fallacy . . . consists in the supposition that what-
ever is found true under certain conditions may forthwith be asserted 
universally or without limits and conditions. Because a thirsty man gets 
satisfaction in drinking water, bliss consists in being drowned. (Human 
Nature and Conduct 123).
For both thinkers, the abstraction-reification account in a nutshell amounts 
to recognizing that abstraction is powerful and liberating,6 yet has a dark side.
 This article elucidates the abstraction-reification account diagnosed by 
James and Dewey and locates it in contemporary scientific work. Section 2 
explores the complex process of abstraction in James and Dewey, and with 
a nod to C. S. Peirce. Identifying three stages in the abstraction process—
singling out, symbolizing, and systematizing—clarifies the parallels between 
James’s and Dewey’s analyses. Section 3 investigates these pragmatists’ warn-
ings against committing abstractionist fallacies, and identifies pernicious 
reification as neglecting three kinds of context: functional, historical, and 
analytical-level. Both philosophers implored everyday reasoners, scientists, 
and philosophers to attend to context. Reification, qua pathology of ab-
straction, results in disease symptoms such as universalized, narrowed, and/
or ontologized abstractions. Acknowledging the importance of biographical 
and social conditions, the genealogy and mutual influence of James’s and 
Dewey’s perspectives are traced, especially in endnotes. Section 4 explores 
how James and Dewey avoid reifying the very distinction with which they 
are weaving their analysis: the abstract vs. the concrete. Finally, following 
the pragmatic forward-looking attitude, a gesture is made in the conclu-
sion toward developing medicines (pluralism and assumption archaeology) 
out of the abstraction-reification account. After all, pernicious reification is 
to abstraction as disease is to health. Such treatments permit de-reifying ill 
models in contemporary science.
2. Abstraction
James and Dewey share a general understanding of the dynamics and func-
tions of abstraction. Thought itself requires the simplification and selection 
afforded by abstraction. James writes: “The act of singling out is then called 
abstraction, and the element disengaged is an abstract” (Principles 1:505), and 
“at bottom the process [of abstraction] is one of conception” (508). He also 
observes: “Without abstract concepts to handle our perceptual particulars 
by, we are like men hopping on one foot. Using concepts along with the par-
ticulars, we become bipedal” (Meaning of Truth 134). Products of abstraction 
facilitate further (and sometimes novel) thought and action. Now, according 
to Dewey, “abstraction is indispensable if one experience is to be applicable in 
other experiences” (Reconstruction 166). Elsewhere, he argues that “abstraction 
is the heart of thought; there is no way—other than accident—to control and 
enrich concrete experience except through an intermediate flight of thought 
with conceptions, relations, abstracta” (“In Reply to Some Criticisms” 210). 
Finally, purposive “selective emphasis, with accompanying omission and re-
jection, is the heart-beat of mental life” (Experience 31). In short, abstraction 
can be conceptually creative and inferentially generative.
 A three-phase schema of the abstraction process helps show the overlap 
between James’s and Dewey’s perspectives:
1. Singling out. Abstraction first identifies and emphasizes a single predi-
cate, part, stage or object of a complex whole, whether the whole be 
material, ideal or both.
2. Symbolizing. Abstraction conceptualizes the predicate (etc.) as be-
longing to a single kind—a concept, a sign, a mathematical object 
or function, in short, a symbol.
3. Systematizing. Abstraction associates (James) and relates (Dewey) 
the single symbol to a system of symbols, a system that is fallible, 
disunified, and one among many.7 A particular symbol classifica-
tion includes laws, causal regularities, and judgments in which 
concepts (James) and mathematical objects (Dewey) are connected 
and networked.
Both the making and the use (for understanding, inference, and interven-
tion) of symbols and symbol systems are contextual and interest-driven. The 
focus in this section is on healthy, generative abstraction that is sensitive to 
functional, historical, and analytical-level context. Pernicious consequences 
of pathological abstraction are analyzed in section 3.
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 While James often uses “abstraction” as a term of abuse in his lectures 
of the first decade of the 1900s,8 a clear respect for the promise and power of 
abstraction is evident in Principles. Our three-phase schema provides a hook 
into James’s analysis of abstraction. Consistently with his conceptualism, he 
holds that properties and parts could be detached both from their whole and 
from each other. An “element disengaged” by “the act of singling out” is “an 
abstract” (Principles 1:505; see above). Moreover, abstraction “leads” (508) to 
the “process of analysis,” where analysis “means separate attention to each 
of [a thing’s] parts” (503). Abstraction and analysis are thus the first stage of 
singling out parts and properties of “elements.” “Elements” can be ideal or 
material, and “[a]ll are embedded in one world” (508). Note that this discus-
sion is found in a chapter on “Discrimination and Comparison.” Without 
singling out, there would be nothing to compare.
 Reasoning and abstraction are explicitly linked:
For his original concrete S the reasoner substitutes its abstract property, 
M. What is true of M, what is coupled with M, then holds true of S, 
is coupled with S. As M is properly one of the parts of the entire S, 
reasoning may then be very well defined as the substitution of parts and 
their implications or consequences for wholes. (Principles 2:330; emphasis 
in original)
This substitution of the entire, rich, concrete S for one of its abstract parts, M, 
is the second phase of our schema. For James, symbolizing is conception or 
kind-making. Making a kind involves comparison and the “sense of sameness,” 
which James takes to be “the very keel and backbone of our thinking” (Prin-
ciples 1:459). After all, multiple Ss must be compared and assessed for same-
ness vis-à-vis being instances of a given kind M. This recognition of sameness 
produces the “denkmittel” of kinds and of “[a] kind’s kind,” which are “logic’s 
only instruments” and are the means by which “we can travel through the uni-
verse as if with seven-league boots” (Pragmatism 88). James often uses “kind” 
and “concept” interchangeably, stressing the “function” of the relation between 
“mental state” and “what the mental state signifies” (Principles 1:461). Concepts 
capture that something such as a feather is this (e.g., soft) “instead of that” (e.g., 
rough), but they hardly rule out that the feather “may be of much else in addi-
tion to that” (e.g., light, rainbow-colored, etc.) (Principles 1:461). As he voices 
in a lecture given at Oxford seventeen years later: “When we conceptualize, 
we cut out and fix, and exclude everything but what we have fixed. A concept 
means a that-and-no-other” (Pluralistic 113). Thus, forming a single kind and 
concept is, for James, the symbolizing stage of abstraction.
 Systematizing, the third phase of abstraction, concerns the extension of 
concepts to unexplored objects, as well as the coordination of concepts. James 
instructively argues as follows:
Though many general characters seem indifferent to each other, there 
remain a number of them which affect constant habits of mutual con-
comitance or repugnance. They involve or imply each other. One of 
them is a sign to us that the other will be found. They hunt in couples, 
as it were; and such a proposition as that M is P, or includes P, or pre-
cedes or accompanies P, if it prove to be true in one instance, may very 
likely be true in every other instance which we meet. This is, in fact, 
a world in which general laws obtain, in which universal propositions 
are true, and in which reasoning is therefore possible. Fortunately for 
us: for since we cannot handle things as wholes, but only by conceiving 
them through some general character which for the time we call their 
essence, it would be a great pity if the matter ended there, and if the 
general character, once picked out and in our possession, helped us to 
no farther advance. . . . [I]f P have any value or importance for us, M 
was a very good character for our sagacity to pounce upon and abstract. 
(Principles 2:337–38)
Concepts or kinds are signs of other concepts or kinds. They “hunt in cou-
ples.” The “statement” that “M is P”—where M and P are, roughly, two 
different kinds or concepts—is an “abstract or general proposition” (James, 
Principles 2:332). This judgment allows us to predict and explain particular 
occurrences or other regularities. For instance, if we have coordinated a kind 
smoothness (M, one concept) with ability to tickle (P, a consequence or implica-
tion, viz., another concept), a new feather, never before observed, of kind M 
should also exhibit P. The “general laws” coordinating abstract concepts and 
kinds thus allow us to “advance.” As further analyses of systematizing, James 
argues that “[w]e of course need a stable scheme of concepts, stably related 
with one another, to lay hold of our experiences and to co-ordinate them 
withal” (Pluralistic 105). In considering “the stream of thought,” he stresses 
how the “scheme of relations” or “scheme of relationship” are “essential” to 
interest-driven thinking (Principles 1:259, 266). In short, abstract schemes and 
systems of concepts or relations are formed in the last stage of abstraction, 
allowing us to satisfy our purposes.9
 Throughout his long career, Dewey conceives of abstraction in various 
ways. He contrasts and thereby groups it with “generalization” (McLellan 
and Dewey, Psychology of Number; Dewey, Quest for Certainty), “analysis” 
and “inquiry” (Essays), “symbol use” (Quest for Certainty), and “precission” 
winther : James and Dewey on Abstraction 5
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(Logic). Our three-phase schema provides a coherent narrative of Dewey’s 
understanding of abstraction.
 Most basically, abstraction for Dewey is singling out. In 1891, still under 
the influence of neo-Hegelianism and defending that a concept, not a percept, 
is “knowledge of what the real object is,” Dewey argues that both percepts 
and concepts are “abstract.” Percepts are abstract because they are “acciden-
tal or limited” and “incomplete” (“How Do Concepts” 145). Concepts are 
abstract because Dewey ties their intension to “a mode of action, a way of 
putting things or elements together” and to a “form of construction,” on the 
basis of which “certain features are omitted. Nay, they are more than omitted. 
They are positively eliminated” (144; emphasis in original). Because Dewey’s 
exemplar of concept in this short essay is “triangle” (144), singling out is an 
outcome of mathematical and abstract construction. Thus, what is omitted is 
not necessarily a loss—leaving out noise rather than signal is actually a gain. 
A few years later, in Psychology of Number, co-authored with the Canadian 
educator James McLellan, Dewey defines “abstraction” thus: “the neglecting 
of all characteristic qualities save just enough to limit each object as one” 
(McLellan and Dewey, Psychology of Number 32). This definition individuates 
objects rather than properties, which is understandable given the topic of 
the book—number (and its psychology and pedagogy). Dewey also describes 
abstraction through the example of a child selecting all the red objects from 
a collection, thereby disregarding “shape, size, material, etc.” (27). Thus, in 
contrast to the 1891 article, Dewey, now in a more functionalist and natural-
ist mode, is explicit about the role of ends and interests in abstraction, and 
he admits loss. In 1929, for example, Dewey writes: “Artificial simplification 
or abstraction is a necessary precondition of securing ability to deal with affairs 
which are complex, in which there are many more variables” (Quest for Certainty 
173; emphasis in original). He speaks of “abstractive simplification” (Quest 
for Certainty 174) and abstraction as “selective discrimination” (Logic 462). 
In short, abstraction is singling out, even if the early idealist Dewey is less 
concerned with the dangers of abstraction, especially in mathematics.
 To exaggerate, while James’s exemplar of symbolizing is concept-for-
mation, Dewey’s is mathematical abstraction. In terms of abstracting single 
entities—that is, symbols—James spends most of his effort analyzing the 
functional relations among concepts, mental states, and objects represented, 
while Dewey frequently analyzes the process and purposiveness of mathemati-
cal abstraction.10 According to Dewey, in forming integrated and functional 
symbols, “grouping, the gathering together the like objects (units) into a whole 
or class, the sum” is necessary (McLellan and Dewey, Psychology of Number 
32; emphasis in original). This second stage of abstraction is also value-laden 
and interest-driven:
We are now prepared to see the reason for the neglect of the sense qualities 
(the abstraction) and for the reference to the whole (the generalization) 
included in all numbering. When we are regarding a thing not in itself, 
but simply as a means for some end, we take no account of any qualities 
which it may possess except this one quality of being related to the end. 
If I am to find out merely the quantity of land in a field, the fact that a 
part of the field is heavy clay and the rest rich, loamy soil is not taken into 
consideration; these qualities do not make the size value of the field, and 
are nothing to my purpose. I restrict attention entirely to the mathematical 
measurements, which in themselves are necessary and sufficient for the 
end to be reached—the determination of the absolute area of the field. 
(McLellan and Dewey, Psychology of Number 42–43; emphasis in original)
Thus, length or area become single kinds or groups of magnitudes impor-
tant to measure. As such, they are granted their own units.11 Symbolizing is 
purposive. As a non-mathematical example of symbolizing, consider Dew-
ey’s example of “the trait of flying” (Reconstruction 166–67). Dewey notes 
that “[l]ooked at functionally, not structurally and statically, abstraction 
means that something has been released from one experience for transfer 
to another.” Abstraction (viz., singling out) “sets free,” while generalization 
(viz., symbolizing) “is the use.” Moreover, “[w]hat is called false or vicious 
abstractionism signifies that the function of the detached fragment is forgot-
ten and neglected” (166). Now, in symbolizing “the trait of flying,” flying 
“is detached from the concrete bird. This abstraction is then carried over to 
the bat, and it is expected in view of the application of the quality to have 
some of the other traits of the bird. This trivial instance indicates the es-
sence of generalization, and also illustrates the riskiness of the proceeding” 
(166–67). Again, grouping or generalizing a single symbol—whether it be a 
magnitude or a trait—is the second phase of abstraction.
 A symbol alone is barely useful. It must be related to, and manipulated 
vis-à-vis, other symbols. Only then does it become functional. Dewey devel-
ops the powerful notion of “acting without acting” to describe the liberating 
and imaginative power of the systematizing stage of abstraction:
By means of symbols, whether gestures, words or more elaborate con-
structions, we act without acting. That is, we perform experiments by 
means of symbols which have results which are themselves only sym-
bolized, and which do not therefore commit us to actual or existential 
consequences. If a man starts a fire or insults a rival, effects follow; the 
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die is cast. But if he rehearses the act in symbols in privacy, he can an-
ticipate and appreciate its result. (Quest for Certainty 121)
This “intellectual transition from concrete to abstract” (123) permits flexibil-
ity, experimenting, and learning, without having any effect (yet) on affairs in 
the world. Manipulating systematically related symbols permits simulation. 
Results can then be implemented intelligently in the world. In addition to 
simulation, systematized abstract symbols also allow us to logically analyze 
a complex and problematic situation. While Dewey’s 1938 Logic is the locus 
of his most detailed analysis of the pattern of inquiry, the 1916 Essays in Ex-
perimental Logic provides as precise a statement of the analytical function of 
a symbol system as any:
They (the concepts or universals of the situation) are (together with 
the sign-capacity of the data) the means of knowing the case in hand; 
they are the agencies of transforming it, through the actions which they 
call for, into an object—an object of knowledge, a truth to be stated in 
propositions. (Essays 34; emphasis in original)
The symbol system, consisting of concepts and universals, assists us in tak-
ing apart, troubleshooting, and transforming a complex and problematic 
“situation,” to use a term of art Dewey employs to great effect in Logic 
(105–22). Examples of problematic situations include a romantic relation-
ship in trouble, or deciding what to do with a certain area of Brazilian 
rainforest. Thus, a situation may involve multi-faceted ethical, political, 
and scientific complexities. That is, should we prioritize saving indigenous 
peoples and/or biodiversity, or provide incentives for cash crops grown by 
agribusiness? Through the use of abstractions, we transform the myriad 
“brute existences” (Dewey, Essays 35) of the situation into reconstructed 
objects of knowledge, and come to understand their mutual relations, and 
the source of the problem, given our needs and interests. Dewey calls this 
transformation “inquiry” and “analysis and abstraction” (39), defining “logi-
cal analysis” as “physical resolution for the sake of getting assured evidential 
indications of objects as yet unknown” (39). Thus, the systematizing stage 
of abstraction allows us to (i) act without acting, and (ii) transform com-
plex and problematic situations. Indeed, a key purpose of the former is to 
achieve the latter. Dewey, now also influenced by George Herbert Mead, 
powerfully summarizes abstraction in a letter to James dated 21 November 
1904, thus: “In logical phrase, without the psychical no abstraction, and 
without abstraction no prescient control” (qtd. in Perry, 527).
 Charles S. Peirce is, of course, an important background figure in this 
discussion. A brief statement of the way Peirce imagines abstraction therefore 
provides a segue between this section and the next. Peirce differentiates “precis-
sion” from “hypostatic abstraction,” where the former “consists in supposing a 
state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being 
logically possible without the other” (Essential Peirce 2:270; compare 350–52), 
and the latter is what happens when “something, that one has thought about 
any subject, is itself made a subject of thought” (Collected Papers 5.534).12 Peirce 
shares the pragmatic view that precissive abstraction results in purpose-driven 
partiality, but he sees hypostatic abstraction more as a virtue than a vice, espe-
cially in the practices of mathematics and semiotics. Interestingly, his analysis 
of the inevitability and power of ontologizing numbers and adjectives, for in-
stance, seems to be the converse of James’s and Dewey’s much more cautionary 
analyses. A logician and semiotician, Peirce emphasizes the positive aspects of 
“hypostatization” (the Greek cognate of “reification”).13 Although this article 
attends to James’s and Dewey’s tales of pernicious reification, it would be anti-
pluralist not to take Peirce’s optimism seriously. In fact, the overarching project 
motivating this article is one of encouraging the generative aspects of abstrac-
tion while avoiding pernicious reification.
3. Pernicious Reification: “Vicious Abstractionism,”  
“the Psychologist’s Fallacy,” and “the Philosophic Fallacy”
Pernicious reification is to abstraction as disease is to health. While the Ox-
ford English Dictionary starts its definition of “reification” thus: “The making 
of something abstract into something more concrete or real,” the concept 
is here considered more generally, as a failure of abstractions to operate in 
life-giving, knowledge-giving, and generative ways. Pernicious reification is 
abstraction gone wrong, resulting in universalized, rigid and narrow, and 
ontologized abstractions. What happens when we deny or forget that, to 
borrow James’s phraseology (Principles 1:461), a this actually is much more 
than just a this-rather-than-a-that? Which nefarious consequences can result 
from imagining a feather merely as soft or a person solely as a murderer? 
And recalling Dewey’s thirsty man drowning in bliss, what happens when 
we take our abstractions to be universal a-contextual explanatory gods? How 
can forgetting the particular function of an abstraction, its historical condi-
tions of emergence, and its appropriate level of analysis impair epistemic and 
moral reasoning, knowledge, and inquiry in everyday affairs, science, and 
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philosophy?  Neglecting the  intrinsic fragility and contextuality of abstrac-
tion is captured by James in his analysis of “vicious abstractionism” and “the 
psychologist’s fallacy,” and by Dewey via his “the philosophic fallacy,” which 
is actually a family of fallacies. In what follows, we shall see how James and 
Dewey hold that the pernicious reification of abstractions is the disregard of 
context, in particular, (i) functional, (ii) historical, and (iii) analytical-level 
context. Such dismissal may be conscious or unconscious, implicit or explicit, 
intentional or unintentional, and leads to universalized, narrowed, and/or 
ontologized abstractions.14 Panaceas for such pathological states of abstraction 
include pluralism (James) and self-critical assumption archaeology (Dewey).
 James, ever the pluralist and radical empiricist, worries about abstraction-
ism because it over-intellectualizes and makes absolute our always-subjective 
classifications, which are only good and true from particular perspectives and 
for certain purposes.15 In a well-known characterization of “vicious abstrac-
tionism,” James writes:
Let me give the name of “vicious abstractionism” to a way of using 
concepts which may be thus described: We conceive a concrete situa-
tion by singling out some salient or important feature in it, and classing 
it under that; then, instead of adding to its previous characters all the 
positive consequences which the new way of conceiving it may bring, 
we proceed to use our concept privatively; reducing the originally rich 
phenomenon to the naked suggestions of that name abstractly taken, 
treating it as a case of “nothing but” that concept, and acting as if all 
the other characters from out of which the concept is abstracted were 
expunged. Abstraction, functioning in this way, becomes a means of 
arrest far more than a means of advance in thought. . . . The viciously 
privative employment of abstract characters and class names is, I am per-
suaded, one of the great original sins of the rationalistic mind. (Meaning 
of Truth 135–36; emphasis in original; footnotes suppressed)
Although classifications can be useful, producing “positive consequences” since 
they are “teleological weapons of the mind,” harm comes with the belief and 
insistence that certain abstracted features embody situations and phenomena 
completely—for example, this man who killed another man is “nothing but” a 
murderer (and, indeed, “murderer” is even defined solely in terms of intentional 
agents wrongfully killing other intentional agents).16 Vicious abstractionism 
is indifferent to other properties of particulars (e.g., the man is also a loving 
father, an expert carpenter), or to other concepts.17 This is a mistake, as other 
particulars or concepts may (i) interact with the small handful of conceptual 
properties chosen or (ii) be useful for different purposes and in distinct contexts, 
or both. Vicious abstractionism thus carves the boundaries of the sensible and 
the possible rather narrowly indeed.18 This pathology emerges from the neglect 
of the functional context of an abstraction:
[The] function . . . to enlarge mentally our momentary experiences by 
adding to them the consequences conceived . . . is… too often forgot-
ten by philosophers . . . [and] is often converted into its exact opposite, 
and made a means of diminishing the original experience by denying 
(implicitly or explicitly) all its features save the one specially abstracted 
to conceive it by. (James, Meaning of Truth 135; emphasis in original)
Following our three-stage schema of abstraction—and recalling that func-
tional context is one of the crucial contexts highlighted in the present analysis 
of reification—it is clear that vicious abstractionism amounts to neglecting the 
function of the concept as singling out one or a few properties and relating 
those to a limited and fallible network of concepts. Indeed, “It is but the old 
story, of a useful practice first becoming a method, then a habit, and finally a 
tyranny that defeats the end it was used for. Concepts, first employed to make 
things intelligible, are clung to even when they make them unintelligible” 
(James, Pluralistic 99). By suppressing healthy local function, this illness of 
abstraction results in universalized and narrowed concepts.
 In chapter 6 of his Principles of Psychology, “The Methods and Snares of 
Psychology,” James describes the “assumptions of Psychology” with a table 
(1:184; see table 1):
Table 1.
1 2 3 4
The Psychologist The Thought Studied The Thought’s Object The Psychologist’s Reality
 The psychologist, #1, takes #2–#4 to be “realities,” and to be “his total 
object” of study (Principles 1:184, 1:197; emphasis in original). Furthermore, 
James critically reviews three psychological methods: introspective, experi-
mental, and comparative. In the section on “the sources of error in psychol-
ogy” (194–98), he presages his analysis of vicious abstractionism, and also 
identifies another important kind of pernicious reification: “the psychologist’s 
fallacy.” With respect to the first, following “[e]mpiricist writers,” James ar-
gues that once we have a word “to denote a certain group of phenomena, we 
are prone to suppose a substantive entity existing beyond the phenomena, of 
which the word shall be the name” (195). We (literally) hypostasize—reify—
the term. Conversely, “the lack of a word . . . leads to the directly opposite 
error. We are then prone to suppose that no entity can be there” (195; emphasis 
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in original). This is a hypostasis of absence. In both cases, we ontologize our 
concepts (or lack thereof ) inappropriately.
 James presents the psychologist’s fallacy in two ways:
The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own standpoint 
with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report. I shall 
hereafter call this the “psychologist’s fallacy” par excellence.
Another variety of the psychologist’s fallacy is the assumption that the mental 
state studied must be conscious of itself as the psychologist is conscious of it 
(Principles 1:196, 197; emphasis in original)
Concerning the first version, James held our language to be a co- perpetrator of 
the fallacy. Under James’s analysis, the use of a concept (“rock,” “feather,” 
“smooth”) is ambiguous as to whether it denotes and connotes the thought 
studied (#2 above) or the thought’s object (#3 above).19 If we fail to differ-
entiate our concepts, perhaps through indexing (e.g., featherpsychologist’sthought, 
feathersubject’sthought, and featherobject), confusions will result. One conflation is 
nefariously identifying the thought with the thought’s object, thereby forget-
ting the functionality, subjectivity, and partiality of the thought. Such perni-
cious reification may be exacerbated by the psychologist herself conflating 
her thoughts (and her thoughts’ objects) with the thoughts of her subject 
of study (and the subject’s thoughts’ objects). This psychologist-subject 
conflation occurs not because of the concepts available to us in language, 
but because of the inherent subjectivity of psychological inquiry. It is a 
conflation of levels of analysis. In the psychologist’s fallacy there are thus 
two main kinds of conflation: thought with thought’s object and psycholo-
gist with subject of study. The former is an inappropriate ontologizing, the 
latter, a dangerous narrowing and ontologizing of descriptions, borrowing 
too much from the psychologist’s standpoint.
 Dewey takes the scientific method as his model for healthy inquiry and 
for analyzing ontological petrifications of contextual function.20 Dewey’s 
most general formulation of abstraction-gone-awry is found in Experience 
and Nature:
Selective emphasis, choice, is inevitable whenever reflection occurs. 
This is not an evil. Deception comes only when the presence and op-
eration of choice is concealed, disguised, denied. Empirical method 
finds and points to the operation of choice as it does to any other 
event. Thus it protects us from conversion of eventual functions into 
antecedent existence: a conversion that may be said to be the philo-
sophic fallacy, whether it be performed in behalf of mathematical 
subsistences, esthetic essences, the purely physical order of nature, or 
God. (34; emphasis in original)
Reasoning and inquiry done well require identifying loci of choice of as-
sumptions, methods, and goals. Lest “eventual functions” be converted to 
“antecedent existence”—that is, lest a partial and selective abstraction be 
substituted in thought for the fuller reality (which includes the inquirer) that 
preceded it and made it possible—the inquirer, whether an individual or a 
collective, should be aware of the choices made, in a historical, developmen-
tal context, for particular purposes. Dewey argues that the reflexive, goal-
oriented, and data-sensitive “empirical method,” so powerful in the sciences, 
“will state when and where and why the act of selection took place, and thus 
enable others to repeat it and test its worth” (Experience 34). Indeed, Dewey 
holds this method, which I prefer to call “assumption archaeology,” to be 
key for the reconstruction of philosophy. This method promises to alleviate 
stark contrasts and scholastic arguments between philosophical schools (e.g., 
empiricism vs. rationalism; rationalism vs. historicism), which so “startle 
the beginner and . . . become the plaything of the expert,” by locating the 
“source” of disagreement in “choice that is disguised or denied” (Experience 
35). Troubleshooting these schools’ suppositions, protocols, and purposes 
permits de-reification—that is, the ontological deflation of always partial, 
yet often useful, philosophical traditions.
 It will be instructive to understand the function of exposing the philo-
sophic fallacy before turning to an extended example, and a comparative 
natural history. For Dewey, philosophical debates surrounding metaphysical 
or ethical realism are quintessential outcomes of philosophers neglecting con-
text, and reifying tentative outcomes of inquiry. Dewey prefers a philosophy 
focused less on metaphysics and more on transformation, reconstruction, and 
the process of inquiry (Logic; Reconstruction). Thus, his mature description 
of the nature and purpose of philosophy is as follows:
Philosophy is criticism; criticism of the influential beliefs that underlie 
culture; a criticism which traces the beliefs to their generating conditions 
as far as may be, which tracks them to their results, which considers the 
mutual compatibility of the elements of the total structure of beliefs. 
Such an examination terminates, whether so intended or not, in a pro-
jection of them into a new perspective which leads to new surveys of 
possibilities. (“Context and Thought” 19)
Criticism permits identifying, troubleshooting, and re-imagining choice and 
selection. Ralph Sleeper argues that “[Dewey] is rejecting the whole idea of 
winther : James and Dewey on Abstraction 13
14 the pluralist 9 : 2 2014
metaphysics as foundational to the rest of philosophy; rather, he is recon-
structing it as the ground-map of the province of criticism, the background 
that shows both why inquiry is necessary and why it is possible” (Necessity of 
Pragmatism 61). Metaphysics is an outcome of inquiry, in a particular histori-
cally situated and functional context—that is, the very practice of Philosophy 
qua discipline. We should not lose sight of the partiality of metaphysics nor of 
the importance of criticism as a social and epistemic function of Philosophy. 
Together with transformation, reconstruction, and inquiry, criticism forms 
the contextual matrix for Dewey’s anxiety vis-à-vis the philosophical fallacy. 
As Horace S. Thayer observes, for Dewey “the role of philosophy is criticism” 
(Meaning and Action 460). Larry Hickman also refers to Dewey’s instrumental-
ism as “criticism of criticism” (Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism 156).
 Exposing the philosophic fallacy is an important, perhaps the central, 
strategy of Dewey’s “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology.”21 In this classic 
article, Dewey refuses to partition the cohesive behavioral unit of “co-ordina-
tion” (“Reflex Arc” 97) according to dualistic categories such as “sensation” 
and “idea,” “peripheral” and “central” (96) or—perhaps the most recalcitrant 
binary—the “metaphysical dualism, first formulated by Plato,” “soul” and 
“body” (104). Using these categories as partitioning tools on a whole behav-
ioral act, a mere “series of jerks” results (99). Moreover, for Dewey, a stimu-
lus per se does not pre-exist a response, whether metaphysically, temporally, 
or even logically. In the “child-candle” example, which Dewey attributes to 
Principles (1:25, 1:97), the “so-called response is not merely to the stimulus; it 
is into it” and should be characterized as “seeing-of-a-light-that-means-pain-
when-contact-occurs” rather than as “mere seeing” (98; emphasis in original). 
Dewey’s refusal to partition, and his denial of pre-existence, are diagnoses of 
abstraction-gone-awry, as we shall now see.
 Three versions of the philosophic fallacy are diagnosed in “The Reflex 
Arc.” First, in an “explanatory analysis” inviting “reconsideration of the reflex 
arc idea,” Dewey argues that “stimulus and response are not distinctions of 
existence, but teleological distinctions, that is, distinctions of function, or part 
played, with reference to reaching or maintaining an end” (“Reflex Arc” 104). 
Standard discussions of the reflex arc, Dewey contends, incorrectly convert 
“eventual functions into antecedent existence,” as he would put it in Experience 
and Nature. Second, not only is function dynamic, interactive, and context-
dependent (e.g., there is no pure stimulus, since stimulus always involves motion 
and conscious attention), but “conscious” behavior must also be distinguished 
from “organized instincts or habits” (105, emphasis in original). Conscious and 
instinctual behavior are distinct, and it is seductively easy to read intentional 
goal-oriented behavior into cases such as the hen sitting on an egg immedi-
ately upon contact with it (104). Furthermore, “the onlooker or psychological 
observer can interpret [an unbroken act] into sensation and movement” (106). 
For Dewey, to conflate conscious and instinctual behavior or to confuse divi-
sions made by the observer with absolute divisions in the behavioral act, or 
both, “is virtually the psychological or historical fallacy” (105). Third, Dewey 
worries about not respecting that “the circle is a co-ordination” (109):
The reflex arc theory, by neglecting, by abstracting from . . . genesis 
and . . . function gives us one disjointed part of a process as if it were 
the whole. It gives us literally an arc, instead of the circuit; and not 
giving us the circuit of which it is an arc, does not enable us to place, 
to centre, the arc. (108–09)
The function of behavior as integrated and continuous with the environment 
and with other behavioral acts is neglected when arc rather than circuit or 
circle (109) is employed to describe and explain a behavioral act.22
 The neglect of functional, historical, and analytical-level contexts leads to 
perniciously reifying a one-way, partitioned, and mechanistically glued reflex 
arc. We forget functional context when we read functional roles (of the behav-
ioral act) and teleological distinctions (for the analyst) as pre-existent entities 
(first version), and we interpret the coordinated behavioral unit as a linear arc 
rather than a whole circle (third version). We neglect historical context when we 
conflate fallible stages selected for describing conscious (or instinctual) behavior 
with ontological phases of instinctual (or conscious) processes (second version). 
Finally, we dismiss analytical-level context when we confuse observer catego-
ries with behavior stages (second version). These confusions lead to diseased 
abstractions, including a universalized, narrowed, and ontologized theory and 
description of behavior—namely, the reflex arc theory. Dewey’s trenchant 1896 
unmasking of abstraction-gone-awry in analyses of behavior remains pertinent 
to behavioral, cognitive, and computer sciences today.23
 Dewey explores a host of other fallacies. It will be instructive to sketch 
out five of these. However, precisely characterizing each one, including its 
exact relation with the philosophic fallacy (e.g., subsumptive, cross-cutting, 
and collaborative), is beyond the scope of this article.
(1) The Fallacy of Neglect of Context (my term): I should venture to 
assert that the most pervasive fallacy of philosophic thinking goes 
back to neglect of context (“Context and Thought” 5).
(2) The Analytic Fallacy: The trouble is not with analysis, but with the 
philosopher who ignores the context in which and for the sake of 
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which the analysis occurs. In this sense, a characteristic defect of 
philosophy is connected with analysis. There are a multitude of ways 
of committing the analytic fallacy. It is found whenever the distinc-
tions or elements that are discriminated are treated as if they were 
final and self-sufficient (“Context and Thought” 6–7; emphasis in 
original).
(3) The Fallacy of Unlimited Universalization (my term): When context 
is taken into account, it is seen that every generalization occurs un-
der limiting conditions set by the contextual situation. When this 
fact is passed over or thrown out of court, a principle valid under 
specifiable conditions is perforce extended without limit (“Context 
and Thought” 8).
(4) The Fallacy of Application (my term): Abstraction from use in spe-
cial and direct situations was coincident with the formation of a 
science of ideas, of meanings, whose relations to one another rather 
than to things was the goal of thought [e.g., mathematics]. It is a 
process, however, which is subject to interpretation by a fallacy. 
Independence from any specified application is readily taken to 
be equivalent to independence from application as such (Quest for 
Certainty 123).
(5) The Fallacy of Definition: The fallacy of definition is the other side 
of the fallacy of rigid classification, and of abstraction when it is 
made an end in itself instead of being used as an instrument for 
the sake of experience. A definition is good when it is sagacious. 
. . . Theorists and literary critics . . . are still largely in thrall to the 
ancient metaphysics of essence according to which a definition, if 
it is “correct,” discloses to us some inward reality that causes the 
thing to be what it is as a member of a species that is eternally fixed 
(Art as Experience 220).
The fallacy of definition is close to James’s vicious abstractionism. In short, 
Dewey is clearly as worried about the dangers of abstraction as about its 
promises.
 James and Dewey critique pathologies of abstraction in similar ways, iden-
tifying and exposing “vicious abstractionism,” “the psychologist’s fallacy,” and 
various “philosophic fallacies” to great effect.24 Vicious abstractionism primarily 
neglects functional context, so that narrowed and universalized concepts, such 
as “bird” and “freedom,” rigidly defined, ensue. A version of the psychologist’s 
fallacy favored by James and Dewey alike, which primarily ignores analytical-
level context, conflates the psychologist’s (more generally: analyst’s) perspective 
with that of the subject of study. This results in inappropriately narrowing a 
variety of possible descriptions to a single one—the analyst’s—and also in the 
ontologizing of said description. Finally, Dewey’s “philosophic fallacy,” which 
mainly dismisses functional or historical context, is a variegated family of diag-
noses of pernicious reification. Depending on the exact fallacy Dewey is expos-
ing, diseased states of universalized, narrowed, and/or ontologized abstractions 
are identified. Table 2 summarizes our analysis:
Table 2. 
 Vicious  The Psychologist’s The Philosophic 
 Abstractionism Fallacy Fallacy
Main context(s)  Functional Analytical-level Functional 
neglected (i.e.,    Historical 
reification etiology)
Symptoms of  Universalized Narrowed Universalized 
diseased abstractions Narrowed Ontologized Narrowed  
   Ontologized
 James and Dewey also provide resources for developing treatments for 
pernicious reification. In a nutshell, James advocates a pluralism (often at the 
level of individuals) of conceptual classifications and interests, while Dewey 
explicitly defends a self-reflexive excavation of myriad selections made, often 
unconscious or otherwise invisible, by inquirers (often at the level of collec-
tives) in building their abstractions. Importantly, James is less interested in 
tracing the genealogy of choice. He favors celebrating a plurality of interests 
and purposes by many individual subjects. Conversely, Dewey is not a plural-
ist about scientific method. Perhaps as a further neo-Hegelian inheritance, he 
advocates continuity between science and everyday reasoning, and believes in 
the overcoming of distinctions into an overarching synthesis in communal 
inquiry (see Phillips, “John Dewey’s The Child and the Curriculum: A Cen-
tury Later”; Thayer 460–87). In short, while James’s primary medicine for 
treating pernicious reification is pluralism, Dewey’s is assumption genealogy, 
or, as I prefer, assumption archaeology.
4. Interweaving the Abstract and the Concrete
As we have seen above, James and Dewey are deeply engaged with the rela-
tionship between the abstract (e.g., concepts, judgments, symbols) and the 
concrete (e.g., percepts, brute existences,25 and existential causes26). Moreover, 
both consistently argue that the abstract and the concrete suffuse one another, 
and hence that the distinction—the abstraction—should not itself be turned 
into a dualism and reified. It would thus be instructive to conclude the main 
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analysis with a brief consideration of how James and Dewey interweave the 
abstract and the concrete. Ultimately, the distinction remains fallibly and 
contextually useful for James’s and Dewey’s abstraction-reification account.
 In The Principles of Psychology, James sides with the “conceptualist”27 over 
the “nominalist”28 (“Conception,” chap. 12:472–73), and defends a teleologi-
cal view of the abstract: “classification and conception are purely teleological 
weapons of the mind” (“Reasoning,” chap. 22:33529; emphasis in original). 
The abstract is useful because it conditions and structures the concrete, albeit 
hardly in the Kantian manner of postulating single, universal, unalterable, and 
infallible a priori categories (or pure concepts) of the understanding such as 
unity, necessity, or causality and dependence. Rather, for James, the process of 
“comparison”30 (e.g., Principles 2:641ff.) is fundamental to creating concepts, 
classifications, and the “determinate system” of “necessary and eternal relations 
which [the mind] finds between certain of its ideal conceptions” (661; emphasis in 
original). Because “the conceiver is a creature with partial purposes and private 
ends” (Principles 1:482; emphasis in original), a plurality of interest-driven and 
fallible classifications are possible. Conceptual systems can replace each other 
in particular contexts and over time. Each constitutes the world. Conversely, 
the concrete always feeds back on the abstract, as James poetically notes in A 
Pluralistic Universe: “[A]ll these abstract concepts are but as flowers gathered, 
they are only moments dipped out from the stream of time, snap-shots taken, 
as by a kinetoscopic camera, at a life that in its original coming is continu-
ous” (105). Moreover, the abstract and the concrete mutually depend on one 
another in that the percept is a “terminus” of a cognitive process guided by 
concepts, whereas the percept “verifies” the concept (James, The Meaning 
of Truth 64). For James, the concrete and the abstract interact dynamically, 
neither being ontologically nor epistemologically fundamental to the other.
 We find a similar abstract-concrete interactionism in Dewey. In one of the 
first essays from his early neo-Hegelian idealist phase, “Kant and Philosophic 
Method” (1884), Dewey takes Kant to task for holding that “[t]hough the cat-
egories make experience, they make it out of a foreign material to which they 
bear a purely external relation” (39).31 This critique of the “dualism between 
[Kant’s] a priori form and his a posteriori content” (“Knowledge as Idealization” 
190) is sustained throughout Dewey’s career. In 1897, Dewey argues that the 
emergence and persistence of Kant’s allegedly dualistic answer to “how is knowl-
edge possible?” can be accounted for in terms of social and political conditions. 
Concrete sensations represent a radical force: “the demand for freedom, for per-
sonal initiation into experience, for variety and progress” (“Significance” 18). In 
contrast, abstract reason denotes a conservative force: “the demand for general 
order, for continuous and organized unity” (“Significance” 18). Only by turn-
ing to broader social and political conditions can we begin to understand the 
“war” (“Significance” 19) between sensationalists and idealists. Indeed, emphasis 
on institutions and historical context also marks Hegel’s influence on Dewey. 
Twenty years later, Dewey insists both that “no theory of Reality in general, 
überhaupt, is possible or needed” and that “there is no problem of knowledge 
in general” (“Need for a Recovery” 39, 23; emphasis in original). Indeed, the 
ongoing “quarrel” (14) between empiricists and rationalists, with their respec-
tive focus on the concrete a posteriori and the abstract a priori, is stabilized by 
another binary: “the idea of invidiously real reality” vs. “the spectator notion of 
knowledge,” where the latter claims that “[k]nowing is viewing from outside” 
(41–42). Rationalists focus on the mechanics of the viewer; empiricists explore 
the qualities and regularities of the world viewed. Dewey prefers a transactional, 
interactive, non-dualistic analysis of “the pattern of inquiry” (Logic, chap. 6) 
and “the empirical method” (Experience and Nature, chap. 1) that does justice 
to “specific events in all their diversity and thatness” (“Need for a Recovery” 
39) and that sees abstractions as simultaneously constitutive of, and emerging 
from, social contexts of inquiry. Moreover, as Buxton and Shook emphasize, 
the organism-environment interactionism informs Dewey’s a priori-a posteriori 
and abstract-concrete interactionism, even in his early work.32
 In short, James and Dewey are hardly slavishly committed to a reified 
distinction—a dualism—between the abstract and the concrete. Both hold 
that humans have particular ways of thinking, cognizing, and reasoning—
that is, of abstracting—allowing us to satisfy our needs and interests. While 
all abstractions, including distinctions, are fallible and limited, the abstract-
concrete distinction is a particularly important and powerful one, for James 
and Dewey. It even permits a reflective analysis of itself.
5. Conclusion: Abstraction and Pernicious Reification Today
Following the pragmatic forward-looking spirit, we should continue using 
the abstraction-reification account recovered from William James’s and John 
Dewey’s work. Moreover, the treatments they suggested should be articu-
lated. Very briefly, Kitcher and Longino provide fertile analyses for further-
ing James’s de-reifying medicine of pluralism, while Foucault and Hacking 
reveal expansive vistas of assumption archaeology, a territory through which 
Dewey also traveled extensively.
 Scientific models and modeling consist of abstractions and are built through 
various kinds of abstractive processes (e.g., Cartwright; Martínez and Huang; 
winther : James and Dewey on Abstraction 19
20 the pluralist 9 : 2 2014
Winther, “Mathematical Modeling in Biology”). Through singling out, symbol-
izing, and systematizing, models carry clear promises for intervention in, and 
representation of, complex processes. But they can also be dangerous. James’s 
and Dewey’s warnings that various abstractionist fallacies potentially lead to 
universalized, narrowed, and ontologized abstractions are instructive for under-
standing pernicious reification in a variety of sciences, including economics, 
physics, and the biological sciences. The last shall be the focus here.
 The philosophic fallacy, vicious abstractionism, and the psychologist’s fal-
lacy can be clearly exposed in selfish gene theory à la Dawkins. This theory 
attempts to explain all morphology, physiology, and behavior from a few basic 
premises, including gene-gene competition and strong gene-phenotype cor-
relation. These assumptions were chosen for specific reasons, but need not 
have been so selected. Thus, the philosophic fallacy was committed, with a 
universalized and ontologized abstraction resulting. Moreover, these conven-
tional assumptions winnow a rich family of selective (e.g., kin and group) and 
non-selective (e.g., developmental and architectural constraints, drift) evolu-
tionary models down to an inflexible model of genic selection, thereby effect-
ing a narrowed evolutionary theory.33 Dawkins does leave a place for culture 
in this theory, although here the reductionist dynamics of cultural change 
parallels that of genetic change: biological (or cultural) evolution is seen to be 
solely the outcome of genes (or memes—that is, units of cultural transmission 
and variation) duking it out on the ecological (or cultural-ecological) stage. 
Both “gene” and “meme” are rigidly and narrowly defined, in a “nothing but” 
viciously abstractionist manner. Furthermore, analytical-level is neglected—
i.e., the psychologist’s fallacy—in conflating cultural processes with biological 
ones. Sometimes, when scientists or philosophers have a hammer, everything 
looks like a nail, in what Abraham Kaplan, a follower of James and Dewey, 
calls “the law of the instrument” (28). In short, Dawkin’s hammer—the selfish 
gene theory or model—is universalized, narrowed, and ontologized.
 In contrast to Dawkins, biologists Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin 
have engaged in sustained critiques of the pernicious reification of abstract 
models. For them: “The problem for science is to understand the proper 
domain of explanation of each abstraction rather than become its prisoner” 
(Levins and Lewontin 150). For example, Lewontin claims that “[n]o issue 
is of greater importance in the study of biology” than the following: “How 
are we to recognize the ‘true’ characters of organisms rather than imposing 
upon them arbitrary divisions that obscure the very processes that we seek to 
understand?” (Lewontin xvii). Indeed, the dangers of vicious abstractionism 
in diagnosing “characters” in theoretical (e.g., phylogenetic; Winther,“Part-
Whole Science”) and applied (e.g., medical) contexts are severe and require 
investigation. Moreover, when biological model-building involves the statis-
tical tool of analysis of variance (ANOVA), we may end up “confusing the 
spatiotemporally local analysis of variance with the global analysis of causes” 
(Levins and Lewontin 122). Finally, the delineation of “racial” groups also no-
toriously involves pernicious reifications in the context of population genetic 
modeling (e.g., Kaplan and Winther, “Prisoners of Abstraction?”; Winther 
and Kaplan, “Ontologies and Politics of Biogenomic ‘Race’”). In each of these 
three cases, contextually useful abstractions are universalized or inappropriately 
conflated with the world, or both.34 Assumption archaeology and considering 
a plurality of alternatives would allow us to start de-reifying them.
 Each of these cases, and more, would benefit from an in-depth and con-
textual application of the abstraction-reification account James and Dewey 
elucidated, and the panaceas—pluralism and assumption archaeology—that 
they suggested. Indeed, without explicit attention to abstraction pathologies 
such as the psychologist’s fallacy, vicious abstractionism, and the philosophic 
fallacy, we will never fully understand the pitfalls and perils—epistemologi-
cal, ontological, and moral—of modeling, experiment, and other scientific 
practices involving abstraction, so important to science in society. James and 
Dewey provide essential resources for understanding the pernicious reification 
of scientific abstractions, and for interceding intelligently and responsibly to 
block and overcome it.
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 1. See James, Meaning of Truth 134–36.
 2. See Dewey, “Reflex Arc.”
 3. See Hegel 116–17.
 4. Abstraction at everyday, scientific or meta-scientific (i.e., philosophical) levels.
 5. Dewey uses both “philosophic” and “philosophical” to name this fallacy—but this 
difference does not make a difference.
 6. See Dewey, Reconstruction 166: “Abstraction is liberation.”
 7. The system is not a mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive, complete Aristotelian 
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dichotomous bin classification. James and Dewey never claim that abstraction produces 
ideal classifications, and would agree with Bowker and Star, who, after pithily character-
izing an ideal classification system, write: “No real-world working classification system 
that we have looked at meets these ‘simple’ requirements [i.e., consistent, complete clas-
sificatory principles; mutually exclusive categories; complete system]” (10–11). Yet, tenta-
tive and non-rigid symbol systems are formed via abstraction, James and Dewey believe.
 8. In the chapter “Percept and Concept—The Import of Concepts” in his posthumously 
published textbook Some Problems of Philosophy. A Beginning of an Introduction to Philoso-
phy (1911), James argues that concepts are abstractions (Writings of William James 234), and 
that: “They steer us practically every day, and provide an immense map of relations among 
the elements of things” (243). However, in the next chapter “Percept and Concept—The 
Abuse of Concepts,” concepts are indeed abused. We learn that “[c]conceptual knowledge 
is forever inadequate to the fulness of the reality to be known” and, in order to defend his 
“insuperability of sensation” thesis, James wishes to prove that concepts “falsify as well 
as omit, and make the [perceptual] flux impossible to understand” (245). Moreover, not 
only are single concepts misleading, but the entire “map remains superficial through the 
abstractness, and false through the discreteness of its elements” (245). Both symbolizing 
and systematizing are understood as dangerous. In light of this concept abuse, James’s 
admission in the “Import of Concepts” chapter that percepts and concepts are like two 
blades of a single scissor, both needed “to live or to understand life” (243) seems somewhat 
inconsistent. In part because of Henri Bergson’s influence (see “Bergson and Intellectual-
ism,” chap. 6 of Pluralistic; Goodman, “William James”), James worried increasingly in 
his final years about the dangers posed by pathological abstraction.
 9. This three-stage schema analysis of James’s articulation of abstraction also elucidates 
his “two great points in reasoning” (Principles 2:340; emphasis in original), namely: “First, 
an extracted character is taken as equivalent to the entire datum from which it comes” and 
“Second, the character thus taken suggests a certain consequence more obviously than it was 
suggested by the total datum as it originally came.” The first point concerns the stages of 
singling out and symbolizing; the second, systematizing.
 10. This is not to fallaciously omit their interests in other forms of abstraction. After all, 
Dewey is also interested in concept-formation and concept-use (e.g., concepts are their 
abstract mode of construction, in “How Do Concepts”), and James in mathematical abstrac-
tions (e.g., “Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience,” the last chapter of Principles).
 11. See also Tristan.
 12. Dewey recognized this distinction, especially in the context of “mathematical dis-
course” (Logic, chap. 20). He used the distinction to great effect in insisting on the “non-
existential nature” of “propositions” used in inquiry (Logic 462–63), thereby avoiding the 
pernicious consequences of ontologized abstractions used as means of inquiry. See also 
Burke.
 13. For secondary literature on this important topic, see, for example, Reese, Short, 
Stewart, and Stjernfelt.
 14. The tradition of biases and heuristics in reasoning of Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman provides a set of deep psychological reasons for reification, which cannot here 
be explored (see Winther, Rev. of Collected Papers, by Stephen Stich).
 15. McDermott encapsulates this key aspect of James’s philosophy thus: “To use a con-
temporary term, James is a master phenomenologist of the original and novel qualities 
of personal life” (Writings of William James xii).
 16. Compare Hegel’s pithy characterization of abstraction: “This is abstract thinking: 
to see nothing in the murderer except the abstract fact that he is a murderer, and to an-
nul all other human essence in him with this simple quality” (“Who Thinks Abstractly?” 
116–17). James critiques Hegel’s “method of double negation” as “the vividest possible 
example of this vicious intellectualism” in that “Hegel treats this not being a concept of 
anything else as if it were equivalent to the concept of anything else not being [i.e., the nega-
tion of a concept is itself reified as a not being] . . . [and] then . . . the pulse of dialectic 
commences to beat and the famous triads begin to grind out the cosmos” (Pluralistic 52; 
emphasis in original; see Morse).
 17. Elsewhere, James defines the term “vicious intellectualism” thus: “The treating of a 
name as excluding from the fact named what the name’s definition fails positively to include” 
(Pluralistic 32; emphasis in original).
 18. Compare A. N. Whitehead: “The disadvantage of exclusive attention to a group 
of abstractions, however well-founded, is that, by the nature of the case, you have ab-
stracted from the remainder of things. In so far as the excluded things are important in 
your experience, your modes of thought are not fitted to deal with them” (59). Whitehead 
baptized one type of abstractionism as “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness” (chaps. 3 
and 4).
 19. Recall also James’s related discussion of “the function of the mental state in signify-
ing just that particular thing” (Principles 1:461; emphasis in original). Similarly, Dewey 
makes a “fundamental distinction” between “a mental state” and “the function of that 
state,” analogizing this to distinguishing between “the heart” as a “thing” and “the work 
done by that thing and its value for the organism” (“How Do Concepts” 142; emphasis in 
original). Because it would further clarify an important distinction between the thought 
and its function, perhaps James’s table should be five-fold, with “The Thought’s Func-
tion” between #3 above and #4 in Table 1 above.
 20. Dewey admittedly abstracts scientific method as a single, monist “pattern of in-
quiry.” Much work in philosophy of science today emphasizes methodological pluralism 
(e.g., Winther “Interweaving Categories” and references therein).
 21. In “The Superstition of Necessity,” Dewey also exposes a variety of philosophical 
fallacies surrounding pernicious imputations of incorrect parts and causal paths failing 
to respect the complexity of the whole. Consider this passage: “When we say something 
or other must be so and so, the ‘must’ does not indicate anything in the nature of the fact 
itself, but a trait in our judgment of that fact” (20; emphasis in original).
 22. See Phillips, “James, Dewey, and the Reflex Arc” 566–67.
 23. Conflating conscious and/or intentional action with “programmed” activity, and 
confusing the observer’s understanding with the actual process, are also discussed in con-
temporary literature. Heil observes “that Fodor’s mistake is to confuse the mechanics of 
description with the doings of persons engaging in the activities which the description 
purports to describe” (“Does Cognitive Psychology Rest on a Mistake?” 325). Similarly, 
Oyama complains about a “subtle, repeated process at work” in conflating descriptive 
and prescriptive rules, in the biological and cognitive sciences: “order is abstracted from 
one system and imposed on a second, then the imposed order-as-program is abstracted 
from the second and projected into the first” (Ontogeny of Information 72). Brian Cantwell 
Smith writes about “inscription errors” (On the Origin of Objects 49–50).
 24. Many questions remain about both the unity and pluralism of pragmatism as a 
whole (e.g., Bernstein; Shook; Sleeper), and of individual pragmatists (e.g., Buxton; 
Phillips, “James, Dewey,” “Organicism”; Reck). I follow Buxton’s, White’s, and espe-
cially Shook’s work in arguing for a continuity between Dewey’s early idealism and his 
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 subsequent functionalism, and for a thesis of only moderate influence of James on Dewey. 
Concerning James’s genealogy, a letter from James to Dewey, dated 23 March 1903 (to 
which Dewey was responding in the passage quoted in note 11 above), reads, “you [the 
“Chicago School of Philosophy”] have all come from Hegel and your terminology s’en 
ressent, I from Empiricism, and though we reach much the same goal it superficially 
looks different from the opposite sides” (Perry 521–22; emphasis in original; see also 
McGranahan). However, given some of James’s early essays such as “The Association 
of Ideas,” as well as Principles, it is clear that James was not an empiricist in any simple 
sense. Regarding the residue of Dewey’s idealism in his pragmatism, Shook claims that 
“Dewey never rejected two central principles of idealism: experience is philosophically 
absolute, and knowledge transforms experience to create its objects” (Shook 215). More-
over, Dewey already presaged James’s “the psychologist’s fallacy” as early as “The Psycho-
logical Standpoint” (125; see Shook 49) and “‘Illusory Psychology’” where he berates the 
contemporaneous philosopher Shadworth Hodgson for the “threefold confusion of the 
individuality of immediate feeling, of constructed fact of experience and of philosophical 
interpretation of the fact” (“‘Illusory Psychology’” 171). Even so, we should not forget 
the influence of James on Dewey vis-à-vis “the principles of evolutionary and naturalized 
epistemology” (Shook 103). See also Misak.
 25. See Dewey, Essays 35.
 26. See Dewey, Logic 111.
 27. Characterized thus: “Conceptualism says the mind can conceive any quality or rela-
tion it pleases, and mean nothing but it, in isolation from everything else in the world” 
(James, Principles 1:470). According to James, conceptualism permits and extols the 
power of conception, discrimination and comparison, association, and reasoning (chaps. 
12, 13, 14, and 22, respectively, of Principles). These are the chapters that most influenced 
Dewey (Jane Dewey 24). Dewey also writes: “It was reserved for James to think of life 
in terms of life in action. This point, and that about the objective biological factor in 
James’s conception of thought (discrimination, abstraction, conception, generalization), 
is fundamental when the role of psychology in philosophy comes under consideration” 
(“From Absolutism to Experimentalism” 158).
 28. Described thus: “Nominalism says that we really never frame any conception of the 
partial elements of an experience, but are compelled, whenever we think it, to think it 
in its totality, just as it came” (James, Principles 1:468). George Berkeley is James’s choice 
example of a nominalist.
 29. Dewey cites this passage approvingly early and late, both in “Self-Realization as the 
Moral Ideal” (1893) (46–47) and in “William James as Empiricist” (1942) (11). A letter from 
Dewey to James dated 27 March 1903, reads: “the articles [of Studies in Logical Theory; 
Dewey articles reprinted in Middle Works 2] all go back to certain ideas of life activity, of 
growth, and of adjustment, which involve teleological and dynamic conceptions rather 
than ontological and static ones” (qtd. in Perry, 522). However, Dewey’s instrumental-
ism predates James’s Principles, as Shook shows. Even James’s analysis of interests in his 
critique of the narrowness of Spencer’s definition of Life and mind as “adjustment of 
inner to outer relations” in his 1878 “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Cor-
respondence” is cited neither in Dewey’s Psychology nor in any of the early essays in Early 
Works 1.
 30. James’s emphasis on comparison and what we today call “the comparative method” 
as fundamental to thinking and abstraction (and as invariably leading to pluralism) is 
refreshingly distinct from the philosophical bias to understand thinking and abstraction 
as involving subsumption of concrete events and processes under laws or causal regulari-
ties. I am grateful to Sergio Martínez for discussions on this point.
 31. Importantly, Dewey was never a neo-Kantian. George Sylvester Morris, a neo-
Hegelian critic of British Empiricism and Kant alike, taught Dewey and influenced him 
during his doctoral studies at Johns Hopkins in the early 1880s.
 32. Phillips draws perhaps a too-strong distinction between “Neo-idealistic or philosophi-
cal organicism” and “Biological organicism,” shoe-horning pre-1891 Dewey into the former 
category (“Organicism in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries” 421). Shook 
belies such an idealized narrative of Dewey’s development. For instance, already in “The New 
Psychology” from 1884, Dewey writes: “The idea of environment is a necessity to the idea 
of organism” (56). In the 2nd edition (1889) of Dewey’s Psychology, an instructive analogy 
developed at some length provides further evidence for his pre-Jamesian organicism: “As 
the tree is not merely passively affected by the elements of its environment—the substances 
of the earth, the surrounding moisture and gases—as it does not receive and keep them 
unaltered in itself, but reacts upon them and works them over into its living tissue—its 
wood, leaves, etc.—and thus grows, so the mind deals with its experiences” (151; the passage 
in the 1891 3rd edition is identical, 132–33). Indeed, “[t]he mind is not a storehouse. . . . It 
is not a chest, in the drawers and pigeon-holes of which the factors of its life are packed 
away, classified and labelled” (150–51; the passage in the 1891 3rd edition is identical, 132).
 33. See discussion in Lloyd.
 34. Darwinian Tree of Life models and “information” talk provide further examples 
of pernicious reification in biology (e.g., Doolittle, Oyama).
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